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   With the continuous development of China's capital market, more and more 
companies choose the way of public offering of shares to raise funds needed for the 
production and operation. Accordingly, stocks’ liquidity and stock fair values are 
enhanced after the listing. By pledging the shares of stocks, listed company can easily 
raise funds with lower cost under the conditions without losing control. Shareholding 
pledge financing flourished in such a context. 
Larger shareholder of the listed company is one of the core of corporate 
governance, which can influence the major decisions including dividend policy 
through exercising the voting rights.On one hand, shareholding pledge financing leads 
to separation of shareholders’ ownership and large shareholders choose ways other 
than cash dividend to encroach the interests of minority shareholders. On the other 
hand, our guarantee law system of fruits of the need to continue to pledge, causing big 
shareholders against the cash dividend policy, directly reduce the cash dividend 
payment.After shareholding pledge financing, the volatility of equity capital value can 
affect the ownership of equity. When stock price fells, stockholders increase the share 
pledge in case the price close to the closing line. If stock price crosses the closing line, 
shareholders will lose control and this will promote companies managed to maintain 
market value of the stocks. Moreover, stock dividend can protect the market value of 
stocks with zero cost. Based on their own interests, the big shareholder has the 
tendency to promote the company to issue stock dividends. 
From the perspective of large shareholder pledge and stock dividend policy of 
listed company, our paper uses China’s A-share market as our research sample and 
explores the impact of large shareholder pledge on the listed companies’ dividend 
policy, including cash dividend and stock dividend. On this basis, we further 
distinguish private enterprises and state-owned enterprises in-depth study. Finally, we 
add institutional investors holding the both external and internal governance factors, 
to explore whether the institutional investors have a positive effect on supervision to 















    We have three major findings after empirical analysis. Firstly, listed companies 
significantly reduce issuing cash dividend after continuously large shareholders 
pledging. The higher the proportion of shareholder pledge, the lower level of cash 
dividend payment. This phenomenon is more significant in the private enterprise 
comparing to the state-owned enterprises. Secondly, listed companies will 
significantly increase the stock dividend after continuously large shareholders 
pledging. The higher the proportion of shareholder pledge, the higher the level of 
stock dividends. This phenomenon is also more significant in the private enterprise 
comparing to the state-owned enterprises. Thirdly, institutional investor holding can 
significantly inhibit the negative effect of continuous of the large shareholder pledge 
on the cash dividend. However, the effect on stock dividend is not significant.  
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图 1-1 2000-2014年上市公司股东股权质押融资情况 
资料来源：Wind 资讯 
2000-2014年，股权质押的融资次数从 2000年的 3次爆发性增长到 2014年
的 4314次，累计进行 16,266次股权质押融资，年均复合增长率 68.09%。 
2000-2014年，股权质押的股数从 2000年的 1.62亿股爆发性增长到 2014年
的 1314.44亿股，累计质押 5,509.02亿股，年均复合增长率 61.36%。 
2000-2014 年，股权质押的股份市值从 2000 年的 17.87 亿元爆发性增长到
2014 年的 14,497.09 亿元，累计质押股份市值 57,282.07 亿元，年均复合增长
率 61.36%。参考实务中 40%的平均质押融资比例，过去 15 年，上市公司股东累
计通过股权质押融资约 2.29万亿元，而同期 AB股上市公司通过首发、增发以及
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转移风险的动机和能力。图 1-2 所反映的 2013 年开始，股权质押市场短期化和























首先，股权质押在经济领域中的影响力越来越大。2015年 6月 15日至 7月
8日，上证指数在 17个交易日内从 5178高点暴跌至 3373点，跌幅 32.11% ，市
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